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The "America" in "American Studies" is an increasingly controversial 
object of study. At a time when minority group claims to serious intellectual 
consideration are becoming more urgent and are producing real change in 
academic curricula, it is imperative that teachers of American culture decide 
precisely what view of the world it is that they are promoting and why. Blurring 
the difference between "America" and the "United States" is only the most 
obvious of the hegemonic claims made by American Studies on behalf of the 
Anglo-American tradition in the New World. Among the most pervasive of these 
claims is the importance accorded the founding fathers of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony and the characteristic style of their rhetoric. The argument of this essay 
is that the typological rhetoric of the orthodox New England clergy was used for 
hegemonic purposes in order to claim, if not to preserve, a share of political power 
in the evolving colonial government. 
Typology, the reading of history as a pattern of promises and fulfillments, 
assumes a guiding intelligence of transcendent authority who touches and 
empowers the typological interpreter. It is the human decoding of significant 
repetitions that places the typological pattern within a specific historical context 
typological signs are the "parts" that hint at but do not fully reveal the "whole" 
of God's redemptive scheme. The interpreter must speak what God cannot 
Typology thus confers a quasi-divine legitimacy upon human political decisions 
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because the rhetorical framework within which decisions are made assumes such 
a legitimacy. The Massachusetts elite exploited the power of rhetoric to promote 
a peculiar view of the nature of the colonized New World, a view that depended 
crucially upon the role of the clergy within colonial government That the ideal 
church-state never became a political reality only enhanced the appeal of a 
rhetorical style that asserted the authority of the clergy to speak both for God and 
for community. 
Recent work by Harry S. Stout and Ann Kibbey explores this coercive aspect 
of Congregational sermons by centering upon the issue of how the New World 
was to be characterized. Stout shows that typology was used in two quite distinct 
ways in colonial sermons. In regular sermons typology revealed a pattern of 
prophetic biblical meanings that were abstract and spiritual in import. It was in 
public sermons, presented on occasions such as fast days or election days, that a 
more literal, expressly political form of typology voiced what Stout calls "the 
corporate experience of God's 'American Israel.'"1 
The federal covenant link between individual and community (the corporate 
commitment to an American Canaan) that attempted to bind personal and national 
ambitions was not a necessary part of typology, yet this connection became 
crucial to the public rhetoric of the Congregational clergy. Ann Kibbey, 
discussing John Cotton's deployment of rhetoric, describes the "referential 
imperative" designed to command belief, which was simultaneously cast in 
personal, psychological terms and in public, political terms. The sermon that 
induced conversion actually converted the believer to the "language of Canaan," 
and the preacher, whose social being was temporarily obscured, appeared in this 
process as more purely the agent of God's presence.2 Kibbey attributes such 
transformations to the rhetorical "turn," which she describes as characteristic of 
Cotton's sermon style. The turn from literal to figurative references unsettled the 
listener and created a semantic ambiguity that could be exploited by a gifted 
orator. Clarity of meaning was purchased at the expense of belief. It was a 
metaphoric mechanism by which this "turn" was achieved, in Kibbey's account 
Yet in the instances she gives, the crucial shift was in fact a typologically directed 
move from "part" to "whole." With great skill Cotton slotted the individual 
experiences of his audience into a transcendent scheme of national salvation that 
gave those experiences direction and significance. 
This compounding of personal and cultural identity forms the basis of Sac van 
Bercovitch's own skillful investigations into the "Puritan origins of the American 
self." Remarkable similarities exist between the specific definition of "America" 
the Massachusetts Bay theocracy used to assert its authority and establish its 
legitimate claim to a political voice, and the vision of America modern interpre-
tations of colonial rhetoric assume in claiming "originary" or founding authority 
for these same Puritans. This prescriptive concept of America is at the very heart 
of American Studies as it has been practiced in the wake of influential work by 
Sacvan Bercovitch and, earlier, Perry Miller.3 
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Since Miller's pioneering work on Puritan thought and culture, a mythology 
of the "errand into the wilderness" and the creation of an exemplary "city upon 
a hill" has emerged that provides the basis for theories about American 
exceptionalism, but which assumes exceptionalism itself. Bercovitch, in asking 
why the power of consensus should be so robust in America, finds that the myth 
of America's typological destiny protects the national consensus. Hedoesnotask 
whether the myth is itself a product of cultural consensus. The answer to such a 
question must be a resounding No! Even among first generation migrants the 
notion of American exceptionalism was being questioned by a powerful rhetori-
cal style that sought to describe America rather than to prescribe the spiritual 
identity of New England. 
The myth of American exceptionalism silences the voices of dissent— 
including most notably Separatists Robert Cushman, Roger Williams and Anne 
Hutchinson—who have expressed an alternative definition of America: a defini-
tion still based upon biblical authority but resistant to the theological impulse that 
motivates typology. Recent work by Philip Gura on dissenting sects in New 
England from 1620 to 1660 points to the formative influence exerted by the 
dissenting voices in that they obliged the orthodox clergy to argue against them. 
In Congregationalism's "unyielding effort to neutralize the influence of those 
who argued for a more radical [democratic] organization of society," counter-
arguments became indistinct from conservative ideological positions.4 Against 
the image of American consensus promoted by Miller, Bercovitch and Larzer 
Ziff, Philip Gura proposes a vision of early America as rent by ideological 
divisions. Within this context, the great achievement of American Puritanism 
was the channeling of radical energies into the American national mythology. 
Even studies devoted to these marginalized colonial voices turn eventually to the 
question of the dominance of the "New England Way," which ensures that the 
image of Congregational hegemony retains its power. But these repressed and 
marginalized energies have never been completely sublimated, despite the 
remarkable longevity of the American myth. The ideological maneuvers that 
shaped American cultural history are clearly revealed through the analysis of 
those rhetorical styles that enshrined opposed cultural visions. 
By amplifying the forgotten voices of the early Separatists, by asking how 
and why their mode of rhetoric was so violently condemned by the orthodox New 
England clergy, this essay contributes to contemporary questioning of the ways 
in which the "America" in American Studies has been constructed and 
deconstructed. 
II 
Typology was the rhetorical style favored by the Puritan colonists of New 
England precisely because of its characteristic linkage of the personal and the 
cultural. In an important account of typology, A. C. Charity discusses the mode's 
central concern with locating an absolute existential norm within the apparent 
chaos of human history.5 This "norm" is a central event to which all other 
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historical events are causally related. Typology seeks to reveal the pattern of 
connection by interpreting the signs of God's participation in human affairs as He 
guides events to their preordained place in redemptive history. At the same time, 
the normative pressure exerted by the typological pattern is registered by the 
interpreter who is confronted with the critical question: what is the relevance of 
God's historical intervention for you? In this way, typology makes demands upon 
the personal and cultural allegiances of the individual whose experiences it 
explains. How one reads should not be unrelated to how one acts in society. So 
typology provides a kind of exegetical binding that relates social action to 
personal belief. Typology legislates normative practices for the individual, for 
society, and for history by determining the shared spiritual essence of diverse 
material phenomena. 
The integrative power of typology found application in the image of the 
Great Migration as a flight, literal and spiritual, from sin to redemption. The 
notion of a typological repetition of the Israelites' escape from Egyptian bondage 
into the promised land of Canaan provided legitimation for the colonial enter-
prise. The typological parallel appears in historical interpretations of the 
colonies, such as those written by William Bradford, John Winthrop and the 
Mathers, which sought to define an emergent nation. But as Stephen Fender has 
argued so convincingly, typology in these historical writings was used most 
frequently to provide a divine justification for migration precisely at those times 
when history seemed to be contradicting all expectations: "It was in moments of 
disappointment and frustration, particularly, when justifications had to be found 
to satisfy metropolitan doubts, and the justifications were arrived at, more often 
than not, by incorporating the apparent reverses into a larger providential plan, in 
which the new world became that 'home' for the spirit which England was not."6 
As a divine justification for America, typology exerted great rhetorical power. 
John Cotton, preaching the typological parallel in a sermon delivered at 
Salem in June 1636, saw the actions of the emigrants as divinely guided, like those 
of God's previously chosen people; the single, continuous providential history 
that these peoples shared made the comparison closer. As the events recorded in 
the Old Testament were foreshadowings of Christ's life, so the colonial Puritans 
saw their New World history as fulfilling the promise shadowed forth by Christ. 
God's redemptive purpose and the covenant that sealed this purpose united 
events. The New England theocracy laid claim to a perfected covenant of grace 
that answered and completed the Old Testament covenant of woiks. Not all 
colonists, notably dissenters like Robert Cushman and Roger Williams, shared 
this view, of course, but the orthodox clergy used the integrative power of 
typology to extend its influence into as many areas of cultural life as possible. 
All of the visible churches were joined through the federal covenant, and the 
invisible church of the elect was joined to them through the covenant of grace. So 
the individual was spiritually bound to the church, to a community-based 
gathering of the faithful, to a divinely instituted form of government, and to the 
providential history of which the individual soul was part. Cultural, social and 
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spiritual desires were conflated by the biblical reference of typology: all three 
became aspects of a significant repetition of divine events; all were aspects of the 
divine will. For seventeenth-century American Puritans, in Larzer Ziff s words, 
"Congregationalism... satisfied and molded their political and social aspirations 
as well as their spiritual longings."7 Subsequently, the perceived shape of 
spiritual history molded the direction of political and social change. The 
inseparability of the spiritual and the material worlds proposed by typology 
facilitated a relatively smooth process of change. Typology provided the means 
by which new cultural practices were adapted to, and legitimized by, ancient 
models. So long as the divinely ordained continuum of history was not ruptured, 
localized changes could be interpreted as aspects of the status quo. Within the 
context of typology, material change could be at once humanly guided and 
divinely authorized. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that typology was the favored rhetorical mode 
of New England's elite nor that typological interpretation formed a part of the 
theocracy's bid for a share of political power. The claim to authority of both 
typology and Congregational theology was based upon the recognition of 
historical continuity. In the case of typology this was a continuity between 
biblical Testaments and the events they revealed; Congregationalism claimed to 
identify a continuity between individual and corporate covenants. Thus, the 
choice of typology by the Congregational clergy was a self-serving gesture, one 
that reinforced the theocracy's claim to power and prestige. A circular relation-
ship existed between church and rhetoric: each assumed and asserted the 
authority of the other. 
Consider now the attacks Separatists such as Robert Cushman and Roger 
Williams made on typological rhetoric and the Congregational ideology that it 
supported. If the Congregational view saw America as the prime site of 
contemporary divine activity and Congregationalists as the privileged witnesses 
of this divine intervention, what then was the Separatist view of the New World? 
Robert Cushman's "Reasons and considerations touching the lawfulness of 
removing out of England into the parts of America" (1621) is strikingly different 
in both tone and substance to the typological experience of migration Massachu-
setts Bay colonists described. The notion of fulfilling a role prescribed by the 
Bible is absent; instead Cushman argued that all of the promises encoded in the 
Old Testament had already been fulfilled by Christ and chronicled in the New 
Testament. Any figurative expressions remaining in the Bible therefore had to 
refer literally to spiritual realities; emphatically they did not refer to prophesied 
future events. In response to the spiritual advances made by humankind, 
Cushman's argument went, God no longer needed to communicate in enigmatic, 
symbolic terms: where "our fathers" had been summoned to God by "predictions, 
dreams, visions, and certain illuminations," now the ordinary examples of 
Scripture "rightly understood and applied" directed the actions of the present 
generation.8 Divine rhetoric was no longer mysterious, it was mystical. 
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The sacred significance of Scripture, in Cushman's view, had already been 
realized—but in heaven, not on earth. Canaan, the land of rest secured for the 
Jews, referred literally to the eternal rest awaiting in heaven. Cushman was 
emphatic that in his time there was no land so sanctified as was Canaan; there was 
no land "given of God to any nation, as was Canaan, which they and their seed 
must dwell in, till God sendeth upon them sword or captivity" (241). The faithful 
Christian of that time had been left to wander in the wilderness of this earth until 
Christ should return to transform earthly reality into a heavenly state. What this 
heavenly state might be was recorded precisely in the Gospels. Heaven and earth 
remained discrete realms in Cushman's Separatist view. 
If the Pilgrims' settlement of Plymouth was not divinely ordained, it does not 
follow that the colony was without justification. Cushman argued that the 
colonists' reasons for "removal" were, and necessarily should have been, differ-
ent from those of the ancient Israelites. It was in Cushman ' s own interests to argue 
so, for in his pamphlet he was attempting to persuade potential migrants to leave 
their homes in England and journey to an uncertain future. Consequently, he was 
more concerned to convince his audience that England did not possess "typical" 
status and would not be the scene of millenial glory than to promote the image of 
a new redeemer nation. He was concerned to discredit the entire linkage between 
geographical location and spiritual events. Cushman therefore presented not 
providential coercion, but rather natural, civil and religious reasons for migration. 
The Plymouth settlers could live where they would do good for themselves and 
others, where they might use land that would otherwise lie idle, where they might 
convert the heathen. "But, above all," Cushman exhorted the colonists, "it shall 
go well with your souls, when that God of peace and unity shall come to visit you 
with death, [that]... you being found of him, not in murmurings, discontent, and 
jars, but in brotherly love and peace, may be translated from this wandering 
wilderness unto that joyful and heavenly Canaan."9 Each individual had to seek 
his or her own salvation in the moral wilderness of this world until, in the last days, 
the reality of spiritual truths was realized. 
Cushman's explicit commitment was to the cause of worldly government: 
his appropriate sphere of interest. This separation of the material from the 
spiritual, anathema to Congregationalists, had as its rhetorical counterpart the use 
of metaphor. Metaphor assumes no prior or necessary linkage between the 
elements it compares; typology, which assumes a part-for-whole relationship 
between elements of analogy, is torn apart by the ontological division that 
metaphor simply accepts. In Cushman's view, earthly signs referred to, but did 
not participate in, atemporal spiritual states. Metaphor could compare one with 
the other but it did not thereby integrate them: each retained its own identity. 
Cushman took the same view of typology: ever since Old Testament types were 
completed by Christ, all types had been confined to a purely abstract and spiritual 
sphere of reference. A similarly metaphoric style of rhetoric marks the writings 
of Roger Williams as he also directed his attack towards the typological interpre-
tation of the New World promoted by the Bay colonists. 
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Turning specifically to the Cotton/Williams debate, we find that Roger 
Williams attacked the Congregational vision of the Great Migration as a divinely 
ordained errand from God. Williams objected to the argument that the emigrants 
were compelled to flee from the sin of the Old World and were directed to a 
divinely appointed place where the renewal of the church could be perfected. 
What he particularly objected to was the interdependence assumed between 
materiality and spirituality. He rejected the remaining bonds between the New 
and Old World churches; he rejected the notion that an entire people could be 
covenanted to God in the same way as an individual; he rejected the idea that the 
invisible church of the elect could be identified with a single national group. In 
the course of their famous controversy, Williams repeatedly criticized John 
Cotton for his narrow attribution of spiritual significance to specific national 
identities: 
For that locall and typicall separation from Babylon, Isa.52.1 
could not well have beleeved that Mr. Cotton or any would 
make that comming forth of Babel in the antitype, Rev. 18.4. to 
be locall and materiall also. What civill State, Nation or 
Countrey in the world, in the antitype, must now be called 
Babel? certainly, if any, then Babel it selfe properly so called: 
but there we find (as before) a true Church of Jesus Christ, 1 
Pet.5.10 
Williams made the typological imperative that nations possess only one spiritual 
identity appear absurd by pointing to the multiple, Babel-like significances that 
real, literal nations did, in fact, have. Were all the inhabitants of Britain to be 
condemned as Babylonian apostates, he asked, simply because the New England 
emigrants came out of Britain? 
John Cotton, in response, attacked what he saw to be the antisocial individu-
alism of Williams' views. Congregationalism was able to rationalize its own 
antisocial aspects, such as the exclusion of the unregenerate from civic power, by 
claiming to act on behalf of the entire community. The part-for-whole logic of 
typology enabled the elite to legislate for the group. Those of the elect "called" 
by God to positions of power held a sacred duty to protect not only the property 
and persons of their subjects but to guard their consciences as well. This 
presumption, this usurpation of divine prerogative, Williams condemned as he 
denied the right of the civic magistrates to punish spiritual infringements of the 
Commandments. His insistence on the clear separation of church from state, 
religion from politics, undermined the very mythology to which the colony owed 
its ideological existence; not surprisingly, attacks such as his alienated Williams' 
Congregational brethren. 
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Williams directed the full force of his Separatist arguments against the 
weakest point of the Bay orthodoxy in attacking the typological assumptions that 
lent authority to its cultural practice: 
There is a Civil sword, called the Sword of Civill justice; 
which, being of a materiall civill nature,... cannot according 
to its utmost reach and capacitie (now under Christ, when all 
Nations are merely civill, without any such typicall, holy 
respect upon them, as was upon Israel, a Nationall Church), I 
say, cannot extend to spiritual and Soul-causes, Spiritual and 
Soul punishment, which belongs to that Spiritual sword with 
two edges, the soule-piercing (in soule-saving or soule-kill-
ing), the Word of God.11 
Williams used a metaphoric style of rhetoric to express his sense of a profound 
disjunction between the spiritual and the material realms. The image of the sword 
of spiritual justice acted as a sign that presented to limited human understanding 
a concept that would otherwise be unimaginable. He resisted as far as possible 
in his own writings the conflation of the earthly with the mystical. Williams 
dismissed the typological concept of a single identity shared by this world and the 
next as an illusion. The sacred could not be known by means of any earthly sign 
and only metaphor could function, though inadequately, to make religious 
realities apprehensible. The divine could not be known fully; in earthly terms, 
only analogies that were acknowledged to be partial could approach the divine. 
This epistemological scepticism, when extended to his thinking on freedom 
of conscience, led to Williams' most lively assault on non-Separatist rhetoric. 
Because fallen humanity could not with any degree of certainty know the divine 
will, every individual had to labor under an individual burden to discover 
salvation. And salvation, once found, could not be fully described on temporal 
terms. In "The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution," Williams used the image of the 
Church militant in his struggle to sustain a clear distinction between secular and 
sacred values even while discussing sacred realities. Deploying an explicitly 
metaphoric style of rhetoric, he likened the invisible church of the elect to the 
soldiers of Christ who bear spiritual armour and weapons; their victories were the 
inverse of those of this world since when they were slain their victory was the 
willingness to die for Christ, and their reward was everlasting life; they liberated 
souls as they "carry into captivity the very thoughts of man, subjecting them to 
Christ Jesus: they are spiritual conquerors..." (363). He sharply contrasted the 
transcendent power of Christ with the limited authority of the civil magistracy that 
acted only for the secular community. The magistracy received its power from 
the human community; civil authority was definitely not deputed by Christ. 
Paramount among all sins, and most likely to cause divine displeasure, in 
Williams' view, was the confusion of these two sources of power, the civil and 
the sacred. 
52 
The want of discerning this true parallel, between Israel in the 
type then, and Israel the antitype now, is that rock whereon 
(through the Lord's righteous jealousy, punishing the World 
and chastising his people) thousands dash and make woful 
Shipwrack O that it may please the Father of Lights to 
discover this to all that fear his name! then would they not sin 
to save a Kingdom, nor run into the lamentable breach of civill 
peace and order in the world, nor be guilty of forcing thousands 
to Hypocrisie, in a State worship, nor of prophaning the holy 
name of God and Christ, by putting their Names and Ordi-
nances upon uncleane and unholy persons: nor of shedding the 
blood of such Heretics, &. whom Christ would have enjoyed 
longer patience and permission until the Harvest; nor of the 
blood of the Lord Jesus himselfe, in his faithfull Witnesses of 
Truth: nor lastly, of the blood of so many hundred thousands 
slaughtered men, women, and children, by such uncivill and 
unchristian wars and combustions about the christian faith and 
Religion (416-17). 
This lengthy passage sets out Williams' primary objections to the typology 
practiced by the Massachusetts Bay clergy. The typological assertion of identity 
between private and public values, between sacred and secular powers, in 
Williams' terms constituted the usurpation of divine salvation by institutional-
ized doctrine: "state worship." The integrative power of typology—the source of 
its value for Congregational rhetoric—was undercut by Williams ' conviction that 
religion could bear no direct relevance to secular politics. His emphatic 
separation of the categories merged by typology, as Edmund Morgan has argued, 
was motivated largely by the perception that typology simply polluted both the 
saçred and the secular civil government suffered through the restriction of the 
franchise to church members; the elect had to suffer the involvement of hypocrites 
in their churches; and the image of the theocracy suffered through instances of 
false coercion.12 
Williams saw the fallibility of human conscience as an argument against 
typological interpretation and for religious toleration. The orthodoxy argued the 
fallibility of the congregation's consciences required enforced clerical guidance 
within the community. (Financially, the clergy required contributions toward 
maintaining the means of worship even if the Congregational form of worship 
was opposed by an individual's conscience.) Roger Williams refused to grant 
immunity from error to clerical consciences; rather he charged ministers with the 
same fallibility as their congregations. Still, if the clergy was not an infallible 
guide to truth the Bible was. But Williams did not assume that the Bible would 
reveal all of its sacred truths to those holding political office—or even those 
(church members) for whom political power was reserved. Williams described 
the Bible's action on individual souls as a gradual and progressive process of 
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enlightenment: a process that was independent of enforced religious belief. By 
enforcing religion governments contradicted the Gospel accounts of Jesus' 
toleration and sô discounted the authority of Scripture. By persecuting "heretics" 
governments betrayed their secular duty to protect the property and persons of all 
their subjects and defeated the professed spiritual aim of advancing God's earthly 
kingdom. Imposed worship obscured the only human access to God: the freely 
willed reformation of the mind and heart of an individual who had been persuaded 
to accept God by the workings of Scripture. Williams promoted a vision of the 
direct operation of the Holy Spirit upon a limited human understanding and 
rejected absolutely the idea of an institutionally mediated relationship between 
God and the individual soul. Consequently, he also rejected the rhetorical mode 
that expressed a mediated relationship between God and soul. Instead, he 
preferred a metaphorical style of rhetoric that sustained a division between the 
sacred and the secular even as it established a provisional relationship between 
them. Through his attacks on the preferred rhetorical style of the Bay colony, 
Roger Williams exposed as non-authoritative the mythology of the emergent 
redeemer nation and, more specifically, delivered a significant blow to the claims 
to cultural relevance of the Boston clergy. 
That Williams' criticism had hit a Congregational nerve is suggested by the 
ambivalent response of John Cotton. "The Bloudy Tenent Washed and Made 
White in the Blood of the Lamb" (1647) revealed a central contradiction. 
Promoting now the glory of God, now the need to preserve the security of the civil 
state, Cotton assumed yet remained unwilling to admit that the two purposes were 
interrelated, indeed inseparable, when expressed typologically. But it was 
precisely the full import of typology that Cotton wished to obscure. He defined 
typology in such a way as to deny Williams' accusation that the Bay colony set 
out to repeat literally the historical experiences described in the Old Testament. 
Instead, Cotton presented a kind of typology that was informed by millenial 
assumptions: he argued for the creation of an earthly New Jerusalem in Massa-
chusetts "not by making Christ a temporal king, but by making temporal 
kingdoms nursing fathers to his church."13 In this way, Cotton managed to evade 
the accusation that he and the orthodox clergy were attempting to force the hand 
of providence by fulfilling all of the literal preconditions for the Second Coming 
set out typologically in Scripture. 
Whilst Cotton did not concede Williams' point that Christ was a purely 
abstract and spiritual being, he did emphasize the spiritual context from which the 
literal events of the Bible derived their typographical significance. Cotton 
defended the interdependence of material and spiritual realms by invoking the 
image of Christ as a divine mediator. Significantly, as he did this Cotton 
implicitly drew a parallel with the mediating role of the New England clergy. 
Cotton did not let pass the opportunity to reassert the clergy's claim to a greater 
share of cultural power and prestige. Christ's power was revealed not only in 
heaven but also in the earthly churches, Cotton argued, and as a consequence the 
churches shared Christ's transcendent power and authority. 
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In the days of Christ's flesh it was incompatible to his ministry 
to make him aking (as they went about to do, John 6:15). Christ 
hath enjoyed (even as mediator) an everlasting kingdom, not 
only in the church, but in the government of all the kingdoms 
of the earth, by his glorious power and righteousness. But the 
kingdoms of the earth are then said to be the kingdoms of our 
Lord, when they submit their laws to the laws of his word. But 
that neither maketh him a temporal king, nor his kingdom in the 
church to be a kingdom of this world. The church and 
commonwealth are still distinct kingdoms, the one of this 
world, the other of heaven, and yet both of them from Christ; 
unto whom the father hath committed all judgment (Job 5:22) 
(204). 
The image presented here of heaven and earth as separate yet bound together by 
Christ was a reformulation of the classic typological structure where the part 
stands for the whole. Like part to whole, civil law was only one part or 
representation of the transcendent law of heaven. Cotton's reformulation differs 
from classic typology where he emphasized the punitive aspect of this relation-
ship. Because the fate of the civil state and the state of religion were interdepen-
dent, Cotton went on to argue, religious failures (such as the failure to destroy 
heresy) were liable to be punished by calamities visited upon the whole commu-
nity. 
The paternalistic attitude that Cotton expressed toward the congregation 
seems to have been based upon this punitive application of typology. God was 
seen to express His concern for His subjects through providentially administered 
rewards and punishments; similarly, the clergy expressed its pastoral concern 
through correction and punishment. Cotton denied the charge that he, with the 
rest of the Bay clergy, persecuted dissenting consciences by redefining the notion 
of persecution: he denied the legitimacy of dissenting voices. Persistence in 
heretical belief, even after instruction in the truth, revealed to Cotton only 
obstinacy. A refusal to recant after such instruction simply could not represent 
spiritual or moral integrity in Cotton's terms: persistence in heresy could only 
signify a sin against both the individual and the corporate soul, never respect for 
the dictates of conscience. Persecution, if and when it did occur, Cotton 
conceded, was punishment for sinning against, rather than because of, con-
science. But conscience, in Cotton's view, was not only a matter for individual 
concern: as the entire community was subject to the consequences of dissent, so 
the body politic was entitled to both spiritual and civil means of protection against 
heresy. The conflation of earthly with heavenly authority in Cotton's account 
outraged Williams' conviction that spiritual errors were to be judged and 
punished by God alone. As Cotton attempted to extend the influence of the 
church, Williams as rigorously denied any such expansion of ecclesiastical 
power. 
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It is in relation to the issue of toleration that their opposed conceptions of 
rhetoric engaged in an explicit confrontation. Cotton refused to modify his 
integrative vision of typology and Williams steadfastly repeated his condemna-
tion of orthodox typology as illusory and dangerous. In response to Williams' 
insistence upon the absolute difference between the spiritual and the earthly, 
Cotton invoked (typologically, of course) biblical authority for the inseparability 
of theological and civil government At the same time, he attacked Williams' 
willful neglect of his own spiritual duties: duties that God had assigned to him 
through typology. Interpreting Deuteronomy 13,Cottonpointedoutthatthecivil 
sword was appointed by the angel of God, a type of Christ that remained 
unanswered and incomplete in the New Testament. The magistrate fulfilled the 
type and stood in aposition parallel to that of the minister of God who was charged 
with the duty of executing God's vengeance on evil doers. Only a carnal, 
"ungodly imagination" would confine the responsibility of magistrates to the 
bodies and not the souls of citizens. The entire set of relationships and 
responsibilities that regulated social life had been instituted by God and as such 
were respected by the faithful, Cotton argued. The social hierarchy was to be 
preserved by the responsibility of parents for their children, of masters for their 
servants, captains for their soldiers, the magistracy and the clergy for their 
subjects. Church and civil governors were similarly placed: where the one 
promoted the health and prosperity of the soul (and, by extension, material well-
being), the other provided for the health of the body and material estate (and so 
contributed to spiritual prosperity). The entire chain of authority was bound by 
the transcendent authority of God. 
The typological rhetoric of Cotton's interpretation defined all human gover-
nors as representatives of the divine will. But Cotton extended this representative 
to all members of the Congregational church. In "A Sermon Delivered at Salem," 
in June 1936, Cotton described paternalistic responsibility and the administering 
of merciful chastisement as duties shared by all church members. The difference 
between clergy and congregation, as Cotton explained it, lay in the superior 
ability of the clergy to decipher the significance of divine judgements, but all 
church members, by virtue of their typologically defined relationship with God 
(as constituent parts of the divine scheme), possessed the right to engage in the 
"loving chastisement" of theirfellows. This was more than a right if the soul truly 
belonged to Christ, Cotton argued, then it desired an ever closer relationship with 
Him and as a consequence the soul was moved continually to recall and renew the 
covenant with Christ. In order to keep itself clean, the soul was prompted to 
admonish and reprove its brethren if they were seen to be defiled.14 
Religious intolerance became a spiritual imperative for both individual and 
community in Cotton's deployment of typological rhetoric. Individual church 
members, standing in the same relationship to the divine scheme as civil and 
ecclesiastical governments, shared their responsibilities and authority. Typology 
internalized cultural conservatism, for each citizen was charged with a sacred 
duty to preserve the status quo. Roger Williams argued strenuously against this 
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conception of earthly subjects as signs representing a transcendent divine will. In 
Williams' view, earthly signs could never unambiguously represent the divine 
will. To him the idea that material signs could be coordinated in such a way as 
to reveal the whole divine plan of history was impossible. 
Both Cotton and Williams were pursuing a Utopian vision of the possibilities 
the New World opened up, but they differed in their conceptions of millenial 
change. Williams' expectations waited upon the return of Christ before any real 
spiritual change could be realized; Cotton anticipated the realization of the New 
Jerusalem in historical time, in geographical space and thus in cultural terms. 
IV 
The extension of clerical authority into the realm of secular government 
formed a necessary part of the millenial vision that Cotton shared with his 
ecclesiastical brethren. The rhetoric in which this vision was cast also provided 
justification for the whole colonial venture as an exploration in American 
exceptionalism. The power of this typological rhetoric derived in large part from 
its capacity to define a particular kind of human subject. As we have seen in the 
case of Congregational church members, typology was able to empower indi-
viduals by placing them in a particular relationship to a transcendent source of 
authority. The exceptionalism of America and of Americans was authorized by 
their shared participation in the same divine history. And the full significance of 
this history could only be known through the typological interpretations provided 
by the orthodox clergy. 
The mechanism by which typology creates and represents a specific kind of 
subjectivity has been described by Harry Stout. Stout observes that typology, as 
it was exploited by Puritan sermons, encouraged listeners to insert themselves 
and their experiences directly into a world of biblical promise. The same point 
is expressed rather differently by Sacvan Bercovitch, who describes conversion 
as a redefinition of the self as a reflection of the church. Church and converted 
soul shared a common submission to the same transcendental power. The locus 
of the conversion process was the conscience—the site of such intense debate 
between Cotton and Williams. Conscience became, in the process of conversion, 
an index of sacred values that transformed self-judgment into a reflection of 
God's (and the church's) assessment of the self. Conversion transformed the self 
into a part of the divine whole and expressed the values of the whole scheme. 
Social and spiritual beings were thus conflated by Congregational church 
practice, and this compounding of personal and community identity was fixed by 
the concept of national election or "federal hagiography," as Bercovitch calls it 
The representation of the church-state as an elected individual was possible 
only through typology that defined the colonial venture in terms of salvation. 
This, of course, provoked Roger Williams' objection to the anti-Separatist 
polemic implicit in a rhetorical strategy that established the orthodox clergy as the 
privileged interpreters of the New World's identity. Thomas Hooker applied Old 
Testament types to the anticipated history of New England in his 1640 sermon, 
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"The Application of Redemption." Hooker used the scriptural account of the 
exodus to exhort his hearers to prepare themselves for the promised "good land 
which aboundeth with prosperity." Hooker justified the use of the analogy as an 
example of God rewarding his favoured people: "[t]he truth of this type, the 
prophet Hosea explains and expresseth at large in the Lord's dealing with his 
people in regard of their spiritual condition."15 Massachusetts Bay Colony 
exceptionalism derived from the spiritual eminence of its citizens, and this 
eminence was demonstrated by obedience or conformity to the will of God as it 
was interpreted, typologically, by the clergy. 
This convergence of the personal and the cultural in the principle of 
conformity was most clearly defined in the jeremiads preached by the second 
generation of colonial ministers. Samuel Danforth, for instance, in the jeremiad 
"A Brief Recognition of New England's Errand into the Wilderness" (1670) 
identified the primary source of spiritual unbelief as the pursuit of private interest: 
"inordinate worldly cares, predominant lusts, and malignant passions and distem-
pers stifle and choke the Word and quench our affections to the kingdom of 
God."16 In sermons such as this, social criticism was cast in terms of spiritual 
declension: failure to meet the conditions set down for salvation—both personal 
and corporate—was seen as a refusal of cultural conformity. Danforth, in the 
same jeremiad, went on to describe how the neglect of hearts, families and 
churches in New England was punished by God in the form of blasting and 
mildew, severe droughts, tempests, floods and sweeping rain. The physical 
punishment of material neglect found a spiritual counterpart in the "famine of the 
Word," the removal of God's ministry that, Danforth warned, would follow the 
neglect of "the Lord's house." 
Preservation of the status quo, in the interests of the entire community, was 
interpreted by the orthodox clergy as a prime aspect of the paternalistic respon-
sibility with which God had charged the governing elect. Typology defined the 
Bay colonists as the chosen people of God, privileged to have God intervene in 
their history; but as a consequence only the clergy, by deciphering the signs of 
God's loving chastisement in material afflictions and by uncovering evidence of 
His continuing concern in every cultural crisis, was able to discover causes for 
celebration and for despair. It was perhaps inevitable that these signs were 
interpreted so as to assure the hegemony of Congregationalism. For the same 
divine authority that validated a specific definition of New World history, of 
colonial subjectivity, and of rhetoric and its cultural application, also supported 
a specific theocratical order in colonial New England. 
The limitation of the franchise to church members reserved political power 
for those who had experienced saving grace, who were assumed to be guided by 
pious values, and who had been subjectively transformed into the image of Christ 
As such, the elect were trained to read Scripture in such a way as to produce a 
consensual opinion about the social application of biblical meaning. The spiritual 
elite was also a political elite: those eligible to vote were seen to constitute a new 
saving remnant, dedicated to the spiritual and material prosperity of the colony. 
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But the convergence of spiritual and social power worked in an emphatically 
conservative manner by displacing the desire for political power (proper only to 
the regenerate, anyway) into the desire to prove one's sanctification by obeying 
the Law. This meant, in effect, submitting to the existent power structure. 
Dissident voices were excluded on material, spiritual and ecclesiastical grounds 
and the dominant rhetorical practice of the orthodoxy cemented this exclusion. 
The most effective challenge to the conservatism of the Bay theocracy 
culminated in 1636 in the Antinomian controversy. Anne Hutchinson challenged 
the typological system of mediations that provided authority for the colonial 
church-state on much the same grounds as Roger Williams. Like Williams, 
Hutchinson centered the debate upon the legitimacy of compounding the sacred 
and the profane. She argued that preachers who urged civil obedience and 
submission to the Law were "legal teachers" who, rather than preach the spirit, 
urged only the moral Law and so directed their congregations into hypocrisy. 
Unlike Williams, Hutchinson took as the target for her attack not the style of 
rhetoric practiced by these preachers but the specific cultural order supported by 
that rhetoric. 
Hutchinson questioned the nature of the community itself, the theological 
justification, defined by the clergy, that validated the "exceptional" identity of the 
New World. Her conception of a direct and personal revelation as the only way 
to know God was radically opposed to the orthodox vision of a pious, useful life 
lived within an orderly society dedicated to God. Hutchinson's rejection of the 
church as the mediator between the soul and God was a rejection of the church's 
cultural definitions: definitions of what constituted piety, usefulness and social 
order. With her followers, Hutchinson denied the authority of the ministry to 
legislate forms of worship for the individual and, by undermining this spiritual 
prerogative, also denied the clergy's claim to cultural authority. By shifting the 
locus of authority from the clergy to the congregation, Hutchinson attacked the 
very foundations of Congregational ideology. 
As a consequence of this controversy, the locus of power within the 
Congregational church was made explicit. Churches no longer attempted to 
disguise the fact that real authority was vested only in the church elders, that the 
power ascribed to the congregation in earlier theorizing was only nominal. The 
separation of church officers from the congregation became ritualized—an 
explicit expression of what had already been implicit—in the seating of officers 
apart from the congregation. John Cotton provided an unusually explicit account 
of the Congregational attitude toward theocratic authority and of the rhetorical 
style proper to the expression of that authority in "The Keys of the Kingdom of 
Heaven" (1640). Cotton considered the difference between the power of 
excommunication, which belonged to the congregation, and the doctrinal powers 
possessed by church elders. 
The like difference would appear if we had seen a government 
tempered of an aristocracy and democracy, in which, suppose 
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the people have a share, and their actual consent is necessary 
to all laws and sentences, whereas a few nobles that are set over 
them (whose concernment is less general) in whom the formal 
sanction of all should lie, in these it were rule and authority, in 
that multitude but power and interest', and such an authority is 
to be given to a presbytery of elders in a particular congrega-
tion, or else (as we have long since been resolved) all that is said 
in the New Testament about their rule, and of the peoples' 
obedience to them, is to be looked upon as metaphors, and to 
hold no proportion with any substantial reality of rule and 
government.17 
Here, Cotton proclaimed the power of the elite and of typological rhetoric (as 
opposed to metaphor) that provided transcendent justification of a conflated view 
of the sacred and the profane. Cotton revealed the true interests served by 
orthodox typology. Gone is the rhetoric of exceptionalism; in its place is an 
explicit recognition of the clergy's political ambitions, which were served by 
colonial typology. As the Cotton/Williams debate shows so dramatically, the 
orthodox typological interpretation of scripture easily became the clerical pre-
scription of a particular social hierarchy (rulers and obedient subjects), simply 
using scriptural justification to promote its own social model. The interdepen-
dence of spiritual and material expressions of power, in typology, became an 
important aspect of that clerical bid for a greater share of political power in which 
Cotton was involved. But here Cotton also expressed the irony of Puritan 
typology, which was employed initially for radical purposes—to justify and 
enable a break with the culture of the Old World—yet which eventually was 
transformed into a rhetorical bulwark against real cultural change. 
V 
The dominance of Congregational typology, together with the myth of 
American exceptionalism it assumed, has provided the context for modern 
discussions of colonial dissidents like Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson. 
Though these dissident voices have been acknowledged, inquiry rarely focuses 
on the manner in which they were and have continued to be silenced. Rather, the 
dominant discourse of exceptionalism ' s marginalization of such men and women 
has been assumed as scholars such as Perry Miller, Sacvan Bercovitch, Ann 
Kibbey and Harry Stout, to name but a few of the most prominent, have been 
interested in the way in which the orthodoxy achieved predominance. For these 
critics, as for the colonial orthodoxy, typology has provided the means for 
rewriting history in such a way that it can assume its "predestined" shape. But 
typology has a more sinister aspect: that of coercion and, for those who refuse to 
submit, historical obliteration. What typology cannot explain, it explains as 
meaningless. What dissent typology cannot tolerate, it transforms into a danger-
ous irrelevance. 
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The conservative image of colonial America, and the mechanisms by which 
the orthodoxy transformed radical energies into a conservative ideology of New 
World exceptionalism, are accepted as given even in recent accounts of colonial 
culture. Perhaps the vision of America as the world's last and best chance is the 
most powerful inheritance of the colonial orthodoxy; certainly it appears to be 
evidence of the extraordinary longevity of the orthodox Puritan vision. But that 
this vision was not the product of consensus becomes obvious from those voices 
of dissent that have proved to be as long-lived as their orthodox opponents. By 
recalling and amplifying these forgotten voices we may begin to approach a more 
just vision of America and a clearer understanding of the aims and implications 
of American Studies. 
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